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Article 
Arizona v. Gant:  The Good, the Bad, and the Meaning 
of “Reasonable Belief” 
GEOFFREY S. CORN 
Reasonable belief.  The Supreme Court’s ambiguous use of this term in 
Arizona v. Gant transformed what could have been a clear logical holding 
into a source of potential uncertainty.  Consequently, lower courts have 
struggled to interpret the reasonableness of police automobile searches 
subsequent to the arrest of a vehicle occupant.  By endorsing an entirely 
new automobile search authority—one that is triggered by reasonable 
belief that evidence related to the offense of arrest may be found in the  
automobile—police search authority will in many cases be expanded.  
Reasonable belief that evidence related to the arrest may be in the 
automobile operates as a procedural tether, linking the probable cause of 
the arrest to the search for that specific evidence.  Interpreting reasonable 
belief as a synonym for reasonable suspicion is inconsistent with the most 
fundamental principle in search law: pure evidentiary searches may only 
be reasonable when based on probable cause.  Gant’s articulation of 
reasonable belief presents a new source of search authority, distinct from 
both the traditional authority granted by a search incident to a lawful 
arrest and the authority granted by probable cause.  Viewing the Court’s 
decision in Gant as a procedural tether—albeit one with necessary 
substantive overtones—is, despite first impression, neither a hindrance to 
police procedure nor a detriment to the public good. 
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Arizona v. Gant:  The Good, the Bad, and the Meaning 
of “Reasonable Belief” 
GEOFFREY S. CORN
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Reasonable belief.  Use of this phrase by the Supreme Court in Arizona 
v. Gant
1
 transformed what could have been a clear and logical holding into 
a source of potential uncertainty.  This uncertainty has forced lower courts 
to struggle when determining the reasonableness of police automobile 
searches subsequent to the arrest of a vehicle occupant—a manifestation of 
how Gant blurred what was among the brightest lines in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Furthermore, on the surface Gant’s 
constriction of authority to search an automobile incident to lawful arrest 
may seem to enhance the protection of privacy, but this is a tenuous 
conclusion.  Instead, police search authority will in many cases actually be 
expanded by endorsing a wholly new automobile search authority that is 
triggered by reasonable belief that evidence related to the offense of arrest 
may be found in the car. 
This Article highlights why “reasonable belief” that evidence related to 
the arrest may be in the automobile operates as a procedural tether linking 
the probable cause for the arrest to the search for that evidence.  In support 
of this interpretation, the Article explains why treating reasonable belief as 
a synonym for reasonable suspicion is palpably hostile to the most 
fundamental principle of search law: pure evidentiary searches may only 
be reasonable when based on probable cause.  Accordingly, reasonable 
belief within the meaning of Gant is a wholly new source of search 
authority, distinct both from the traditional authority granted by a search 
incident to a lawful arrest (“SITLA”) and the authority granted by probable 
cause.  Finally, the Article explains why viewing the Court’s decision in 
Gant as a procedural tether—albeit one with necessary substantive 
overtones—is, despite first impression, neither a hindrance to police 
procedure nor a detriment to the public good. 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law in Houston, Texas.  Previously Lieutenant 
Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps.  I would like to thank Lorne Book, Rachel 
Smith, and Amanda Williams for their excellent contributions in support of completing this Article. 
1 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“[C]ircumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search 
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest 
might be found in the vehicle.’” (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., concurring))). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Gant’s core holding constricts the authority to search an automobile 
incident to lawful arrest, an authority established by the Court almost thirty 
years earlier in New York v. Belton.
2
  In so holding, the Court reasoned that 
once the arrestee is secure, a subsequent search of the vehicle is only 
justified if there is “reasonable belief” that evidence of the offense of arrest 
might be found in the vehicle.
3
  The Court concluded that Belton had 
evolved to a point that could no longer be justified by the underlying 
exigency rationale for SITLA,
4
 creating an automatic and unrestricted 
search authority whenever the police arrested an occupant or recent 
occupant of an automobile.
5
  Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
Belton’s SITLA authority must be restricted to only those situations 
involving a genuine risk that the arrestee could gain access to the passenger 
compartment of the automobile immediately after arrest,
6
 with that 
authority expiring once the arrestee is secured in a manner that deprives 
her of any meaningful access to the automobile.
7
 
Had the Court’s analysis been limited to defining the constriction of 
Belton’s SITLA authority, little uncertainty would have resulted: once an 
arrestee was effectively secured, an alternative exception to the warrant 
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment would then 
govern the reasonableness of all other intrusions into the arrestee’s 
automobile.
8
  The Court, however, did not limit its analysis to this 
continuum.  Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens introduced an 
apparently new standard—inspired by Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
                                                                                                                          
2 453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981).  
3 Gant, 556 U.S at 335. 
4 See id. at 343 (“To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent 
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel 
 exception . . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., id. at 345–46 (2009) (“Courts that have read Belton expansively are at odds regarding 
how close in time to the arrest and how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first contact 
with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within Belton’s purview and whether a search is 
reasonable when it commences or continues after the arrestee has been removed from the scene.  The 
rule has thus generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a ‘bright 
line.’” (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
§ 7.1(c), 514–18 (4th ed. 2004) (“Thus, under Belton a search of the vehicle is allowed even after the 
defendant was removed from it . . . . But because Belton abandoned the presumably difficult-to-apply 
‘immediate control’ test of Chimel in favor of a ‘bright line,’ it is most certainly arguable that an on-
the-scene requirement is appropriate as the nearest available ‘bright line.’”))). 
6 Id. at 343. 
7 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search.” (emphasis added)). 
8 See id. at 335 (concluding, in addition to clarifying Belton, that “circumstances unique to the 
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of 
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle”). 
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Thornton v. United States
9—to justify a search of an automobile: “We also 
conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a 
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of 
the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”10  Until Gant, no such 
reasonable belief test for assessing a reasonable search existed in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.
11
  Instead, a two-prong equation had become 
settled law:  (1) a full evidentiary search is reasonable only when supported 
by probable cause; and (2) a cursory protective inspection is reasonable 
based on a lower quantum of reasonable suspicion.
12
  
This reasonable belief justification must be distinct from the authority 
to conduct a SITLA.  This is because the reasonableness of a SITLA has 
never depended on the presence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion 
of discovering evidence.  Instead, SITLA is justified by the exigency 
created by the lawful predicate arrest.
13
  Indeed, the core holding of Gant 
reflected this by excluding the search for evidence in Gant’s car from the 
reasonable scope of a SITLA.
14
  Accordingly, Gant introduced an 
apparently new test into the existing continuum of reasonableness analysis, 
a test that has and will continue to produce uncertainty.  This uncertainty 
has forced lower courts to struggle to identify the meaning and scope of 
                                                                                                                          
9 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would therefore limit Belton searches to 
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.”).  But see id. at 623–24 (majority opinion) (holding that a warrantless search conducted under 
the SITLA exception did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the suspect had exited the 
vehicle prior to being stopped by police, because the suspect was still found to have been a “recent 
occupant” of the vehicle, such that the SITLA fell within the Belton exception). 
10 Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.  But see Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 n.4 (“Whatever the merits of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment, this is the wrong case in which to address them.  
Petitioner has never argued that Belton should be limited ‘to cases where it is reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle,’ nor did any court below 
consider Justice Scalia’s reasoning.” (citation omitted)). 
11 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 363–64 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the second part of the Court’s 
two-part test, which the Court borrowed from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Thornton). 
12 See Memorandum from Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, Am. L. Div., Cong. Res. Serv.  to 
Mike Davidson, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and 
Reasonableness Standards in the Context of the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 3 (Jan. 30, 2006) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is of relatively recent  
origins. . . . [U]nder certain exigencies of time and place police officers may conduct a limited seizure 
and search with less than probable cause . . . .” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968))), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m013006.pdf) (last visited June 19, 2012). 
13 See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at 337–38 (reasoning that, based on Chimel, the SITLA exception to 
the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation). 
14 See id. at 335 (“Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed and 
locked in the back of a patrol car . . . . Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle 
search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the 
interior of the vehicle.”). 
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reasonable belief.
15
  Indeed, lower court decisions have begun to evince 
several possible interpretations. 
First, “reasonable belief” may be interpreted as a synonym for 
reasonable suspicion
16—a rational interpretation based on the similarity of 
the two terms.  However, this interpretation renders a full search of an 
automobile reasonable based on a quantum of proof lower than probable 
cause, a result clearly in conflict with longstanding Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.
17
  Second, “reasonable belief” could be interpreted as a 
synonym for probable cause.
18
  This interpretation would certainly 
reconcile the decision with prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
However, such a reading ignores the Court’s use of a term distinct from 
traditional probable cause terminology, as well as the Court’s recitation of 
pre-existing search authority (including probable cause search authority).  
Thus, it is simply impossible to reconcile Gant with the pre-existing 
probable cause–reasonable suspicion continuum.  Accordingly, there is a 
compelling argument in support of recognition of a new test for a limited 
category of reasonable automobile searches. 
The Gant Court’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
Thornton
19
 is critical to properly understand the meaning of this new test.  
In Thornton, Justice Scalia asserted that the search of a recently arrested 
defendant’s vehicle was not based on a necessity to protect evidence from 
destruction.
20
  Instead, the search was justified based on the relationship 
between the evidence and the nature of the offense for which the defendant 
was arrested.
21
  If this justification holds, “reasonable belief” could in fact 
mean probable cause.  This, however, is a dubious interpretation.  There is 
                                                                                                                          
15 See, e.g., People v. Coates, 266 P.3d 397, 399 (Colo. 2011) (creating and using the term 
“reasonable articulable suspicion” in the wake of Gant to describe the necessary quantum of proof 
needed by police to conduct a SITLA for evidence related to the crime of arrest). 
16 See Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective 
Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 772 (2010) 
(“[R]easonable suspicion . . . [requires] that ‘the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based 
on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger.’” 
(second emphasis added) (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990))). 
17 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures “wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 
‘expectation of privacy’”). 
18 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“[T]he substance of all the  
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and that the belief of guilt must 
be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” (emphasis added)). 
19 541 U.S. 615, 625–32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
20 Id. at 625. 
21 See id. at 629–30  (arguing that “it is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most 
likely to be found where the suspect was apprehended,” thus “[t]he fact of prior lawful arrest 
distinguishes . . . a search for evidence of his crime from general rummaging”). 
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no question that probable cause must exist to justify the arrest.
22
  
According to Justice Scalia, when that probable cause relates to an offense 
for which related evidence may be found at the scene of the arrest, it is the 
arrest itself that justifies the subsequent search of that scene; the probable 
cause for the arrest effectively provides concurrent justification for the 
search.
23
  Based on this reasoning, this Article asserts that “reasonable 
belief” does not indicate a new substantive causal standard justifying a 
search of an automobile, but instead introduces a link—or procedural 
tether—connecting probable cause for an arrest with a subsequent search 
of a recently occupied automobile for offense-related evidence. 
Part III of this Article will trace the evolution of the Belton SITLA 
authority from its origin in Belton to the Gant backlash.  Part IV will 
address the uncertainty triggered by Gant’s “reasonable belief” language 
through analysis of several illustrative post-Gant decisions.  Part V will 
analyze the lineage of the “reasonable belief” concept adopted by the Gant 
Court, and how that lineage supports the conclusion that “reasonable 
belief” creates a procedural tether to the probable cause for arrest.  Part VI 
then assesses Gant’s impact on the interests of law enforcement and the 
individual citizen.  Part VII concludes that interpreting “reasonable belief” 
within the meaning of Gant as a distinct concept from both traditional 
SITLA authority and the authority granted by probable cause is the only 
interpretation consistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
and that interpreting “reasonable belief” as a procedural tether—albeit one 
with necessary substantive overtones—is neither a hindrance to police 
procedure nor a detriment to the public good despite first appearances. 
III.  FROM BELTON TO GANT 
The uncertainty created by the Court’s use of “reasonable belief” in 
Gant was a reaction, in part, to the legal fiction in Belton that had 
expanded what constitutes “an area within a suspect’s immediate 
control.”24  Based on this legal fiction, in 1981, the Supreme Court 
extended the longstanding authority for police to conduct a full search 
incident to lawful arrest to the interior compartment of an automobile 
following the arrest of its occupants.
25
 
                                                                                                                          
22 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (equating lawful 
arrest with probable cause); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (“[E]very  
arrest . . . is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (explaining that a custodial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
23 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
24 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
25 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
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A.  Setting the Conditions:  Belton, SITLA, and the Gant Backlash 
 In New York v. Belton,
26
 a New York State Police Officer stopped a car 
traveling on the New York State Thruway for erratic driving.
27
  When the 
officer approached the vehicle, he detected an odor of marijuana coming 
from the passenger compartment.
28
  He also observed a brown paper bag 
on the floor in front of the passenger seat with “Supergold” written on it.29  
Based on this information, the officer ordered the four vehicle passengers 
to exit, placed them under arrest, and had them sit on the side of the road.
30
  
No other officers were present at the scene.
31
  Without seeking consent, the 
officer proceeded to search the interior of the automobile, where he found 
a jacket belonging to the passenger Belton.
32
  He then searched the pockets 
of the jacket, in which he found cocaine.
33
  Belton was subsequently 
prosecuted for possession of cocaine.
34
 
Belton sought to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an unreasonable 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the state via the 
Fourteenth Amendment).
35
  Belton argued, and the New York Court of 
Appeals agreed, that the officer exceeded the scope of the SITLA authority 
triggered by the arrest of the vehicle occupants because the interior of the 
vehicle and the jacket were beyond the wingspan of the arrestees at the 
time of the search.
36
  This argument relied on Chimel v. California,
37
 in 
which the Court held that it was reasonable to search within an arrestee’s 
“immediate control” in order both to preserve evidence by protecting it 
from possible destruction by the arrestee and to discover weapons that 
might be used to harm the police and/or facilitate the arrestee’s escape.38  
In Chimel, the Court held that extending the SITLA beyond the arrestee’s 
                                                                                                                          
26 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
27 Id. at 455. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 455–56. 
30 Id. at 456. 
31 Id. at 457. 
32 Id. at 456. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 395 U.S. 752 (1969).  
38 Id. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest 
or effect his escape. . . . And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.  A gun on a table or in a drawer in front 
of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of 
the person arrested.  There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the 
area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”).  As noted throughout this Article, this 
has become known as the “wingspan” rule. 
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wingspan exceeded the scope justified by the recent arrest and was 
therefore unreasonable absent an alternative justification.
39
 
In Belton, the Court rejected the Chimel argument that the search of the 
automobile interior, and containers therein, was unreasonable because it 
exceeded the wingspan of the arrestees.
40
  In an effort to establish a 
universally applicable reasonableness standard in the automobile context, 
the Court created what was really a fiction: that the interior of the 
automobile remained within the “lunging distance” of the arrestees.41  Of 
course, Belton was the ideal case for extending the wingspan rule: 
outnumbered four to one, with the suspects seated near the vehicle, the 
arresting officer was at a distinct disadvantage.
42
  Nonetheless, there was 
no indication that a sense of exigency motivated his search, nor did the 
Court qualify the extension of the SITLA authority in any way that 
required proof of such a tactical disadvantage for the arresting officer.  
Instead, the decision seemed to grant police the automatic authority to 
conduct a general search of the interior of an automobile, and any 
containers found therein, following the arrest of its occupants.
43
 
In Belton, the officer was arguably searching for narcotics—evidence 
related to the offense for which he had just arrested the suspects.
44
  
However, SITLA has never been limited in scope to fruits related to the 
offense that triggers the search.  From the inception of SITLA as a basis to 
establish the reasonableness of a police search, the immediate search of the 
area within the arrestee’s wingspan was deemed reasonable by the 
exigency of the arrestee’s ability to access evidence or weapons.45  
Accordingly, SITLA has always stood as an exception not only to the 
                                                                                                                          
39 See id. at 768 (“The search here went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the area from 
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as 
evidence against him.  There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for 
extending the search beyond that area.  The scope of the search was, therefore, ‘unreasonable’ . . . .”). 
40 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a 
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the 
arrest requires no additional justification.”). 
41 See id. at 460 (suggesting that “articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which 
an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’” (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
763));  infra notes 137 and 138 and accompanying text. 
42 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56 (describing the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the four 
car occupants by a single policeman). 
43 See id. at 460 (“[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
that automobile.”). 
44 Id. at 456. 
45 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (asserting that it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the arrestee in order to remove concealed weapons and prevent the 
destruction or concealment of evidence, and that “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule”). 
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warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but also to the probable 
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
46
  Because police are 
authorized to search for any evidence or contraband, there has never been a 
link between the scope of the SITLA and evidence related to the arrested 
offense.
47
 Indeed, any requirement to establish such a link was 
categorically rejected by the Court in United States v. Robinson,
48
 where 
the Court held that “[t]he standards traditionally governing a search 
incident to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry 
standards by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the 
particular crime for which the arrest is made.”49  The Court further noted 
that: 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a 
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that 
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires 
no additional justification.  It is the fact of the lawful arrest 
which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in 
the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person 
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search under 
that Amendment.
50
 
So much has been apparent in the Court’s pre-Gant SITLA 
jurisprudence.  Exigency, and not the discovery of evidence, became the 
predominant interest that the exception advanced.  Accordingly, the Court 
extended the SITLA exception to cover not only the arrested automobile 
occupant but also the recent occupant of an automobile arrested shortly 
after exiting the vehicle.
51
  In Thornton v. United States,
52
 the Court held 
reasonable the search of the suspect’s automobile following his arrest after 
he exited the vehicle.
53
  According to the Court, extending SITLA to such 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (arguing that seizure of private 
documents from the accused’s home, in his absence and without a warrant, runs afoul of the protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
47 See id. at 392 (explaining that the Government’s right “to search the person of the accused 
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime . . . has been uniformly 
maintained in many cases”). 
48 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
49 Id. at 234. 
50 Id. at 235. 
51 See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (“Belton allows police to search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both ‘occupant[s]’ and 
‘recent occupant[s].’”). 
52 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
53 See id. at 620 (“[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of 
that automobile.” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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situations was consistent with its underlying exigency and police safety 
justifications: it was simply untenable to force an officer into the 
“Hobson’s choice”54 of either approaching a vehicle in which the suspect 
might be armed in order to preserve the authority to search the vehicle 
upon arrest, or sacrificing that search authority by allowing the suspect to 
exit the vehicle into full view before initiating the arrest.
55
   
Following Thornton, the only lingering uncertainty surrounding 
automobile SITLA authority was how proximate the exiting driver must be 
to the vehicle before the authority dissipated.
56
  Accordingly, the 
admissibility of evidence seized from the interior compartment of an 
automobile, or a container therein, following the lawful arrest of a driver or 
occupant became a genuine article of faith.  Lawful arrest was the sine qua 
non for admissibility.  Other factors relating to the arrest were simply 
irrelevant, including: the nature of the offense; whether the offense was 
one traditionally associated with violence; the relative probability or 
improbability that evidence related to the offense might be in the vehicle; 
the ability of the suspect to gain access to the vehicle at the time of the 
search; the number of officers at the scene; the number of suspects; or the 
location of the vehicle.  In short, an arrest for a minor traffic infraction of 
the proverbial eighty-year-old grandmother triggered the authority to 
search the entire interior compartment of her automobile, even if she was 
secured in the back of the arresting officer’s police cruiser with numerous 
other officers on the scene. 
B.  Arizona v. Gant and the End of the Blank Check 
The Court’s Gant decision thus rested on the background of the 
apparently unlimited search authority triggered by the arrest of an 
automobile occupant or recent occupant.
57
  In many ways, Gant provided 
as compelling a set of facts as Belton to revisit the automobile exception 
that Belton established in the first instance.  Unlike the Belton situation of 
an outnumbered officer who discovered evidence somewhat related to the 
arresting offense, Gant involved a situation where neither the search for 
evidence nor officer safety seemed to justify the subsequent automobile 
search.
58
 
                                                                                                                          
54 A “Hobson’s choice” is a “take it or leave it” option in which a party is offered the free choice 
of only one option.  According to the Court, “a Hobson’s choice is not a choice, whatever the reason 
for being Hobsonian.”  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 707 (2002). 
55 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622. 
56 See United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1038–41 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding automobile 
search conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car); United States v. 
Barnes, 374 F.3d 601, 602–03 (8th Cir. 2004) (same). 
57 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2009). 
58 See id. at 344 (“Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-
related evidence authorized the search in this case.”). 
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In Gant, police arrested the suspect for driving with a suspended 
license.
59
  Following his arrest, Gant was secured in the back seat of a 
locked police cruiser.
60
  Several other police cruisers and officers were 
present at the scene.
61
  Nonetheless, the police proceeded to search the 
interior of Gant’s automobile.  In Gant’s automobile, police discovered and 
seized evidence unrelated to the offense of driving with a suspended 
license.
62
  Prior to his trial on charges of possession of a weapon and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, Gant moved to suppress the evidence 
discovered in his car.
63
  At the outset, the trial court rejected the state’s 
assertion that the police acted upon probable cause that evidence related to 
the arresting offense would be found in the car so as to trigger the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
64
  This was a critical 
conclusion, for it eliminated the only plausible alternative justification for 
a warrantless search of the car.  However, the trial court then applied the 
Belton/Thornton rule and concluded that the search was reasonable 
because Gant had been lawfully arrested immediately after exiting his 
vehicle.
65
 
Gant appealed the issue to the Arizona Supreme Court, which 
ultimately rejected the trial court’s application of the SITLA exception and 
reversed Gant’s conviction.66  The U.S. Supreme Court summarized the 
Arizona Supreme Court’s rationale as follows: 
[T]he Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of 
Gant’s car was unreasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The court’s opinion discussed at length 
our decision in Belton, which held that police may search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers 
therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the 
vehicle’s recent occupant.  The court distinguished Belton as 
a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search 
incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the 
threshold question whether the police may conduct a search 
incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.”  Relying on 
our earlier decision in Chimel, the court observed that the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and 
                                                                                                                          
59 Id. at 332. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 344. 
62 Id. at 336. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 337. 
66 Id. 
 2012] ARIZONA V. GANT 189 
 
evidence preservation.  When “the justifications underlying 
Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the 
arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, 
and under the supervision of an officer,” the court concluded, 
a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified 
as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the 
destruction of evidence.” Accordingly, the court held that the 
search of Gant’s car was unreasonable.67 
The Supreme Court then noted that the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
dissenting justices rejected the majority’s consideration of any actual 
Chimel justification as the basis for the reversal.
68
  For the dissent, such 
consideration of actual exigency was inconsistent with the Belton/Thornton 
SITLA rule.
69
  In essence, the dissent understood SITLA as an automatic 
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, regardless of 
how attenuated from the original Chimel SITLA rationale a particular 
application might be.
70
  However, the dissent also acknowledged that the 
bright line Belton rule had become difficult to justify in cases like Gant’s, 
and therefore joined in the call for reconsideration by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
71
  That request landed on a receptive Court, which noted in its 
opinion: “The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, 
scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s 
clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles.  We therefore 
granted the State’s petition for certiorari.”72 
In a 5–4 majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of its Arizona counterpart, in large 
measure adopting the rationale of the state supreme court.
73
  Focusing on 
the original exigency justification upon which Belton was built, the Court 
rejected a broad reading of Belton.
74
  Instead, it limited the application of 
Belton’s SITLA authority to those situations in which a recent arrestee 
could legitimately gain access to the interior of the automobile:  
“Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel 
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”75 
                                                                                                                          
67 Id. at 337–38 (citations omitted). 
68 Id. at 338 (quoting State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 647 (Ariz. 2007) (Bales, J., dissenting), aff’d, 
556 U.S. 332 (2009)). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 338. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 351. 
74 Id. at 343. 
75 Id. 
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Had the Court stopped there, Gant would have been nothing more than 
a clarification on the applicability of the Belton rule.  However, in a 
separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia interjected a somewhat 
perplexing new element into the meaning of the decision.  Drawing on his 
concurring opinion in Thornton, Justice Scalia added a new dimension to 
the trigger for a Belton SITLA, a dimension that migrated to the holding of 
Gant, reasoning: “Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also 
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search 
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”76 
Thus, Gant qualified Belton, and then ostensibly modified its own 
qualifier.  The decision qualified Belton by limiting its applicability to 
situations where an arrestee retains genuine access to the automobile—
ostensibly irrespective of the nature of the offense for which the suspect 
was arrested.
77
  However, Justice Scalia’s Thornton opinion provided the 
foundation for an exception to this qualifier: even when access to the 
vehicle has been eliminated by police control, a search is still reasonable 
whenever the police have a “reasonable belief” that evidence related to the 
crime might be in the vehicle.
78
 
This reasonable belief modifier would have been relatively 
unremarkable had Justice Scalia utilized slightly different language.  
Probable cause would have been the easiest terminology to reconcile with 
existing jurisprudence.  Pursuant to the longstanding automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search of an automobile based on 
probable cause is reasonable.
79
  This exception operates independently of 
the Belton SITLA.
80
  Accordingly, even if the recent occupant is secured in 
a manner that eliminates access to the automobile, police with probable 
cause that evidence related to the offense for which the occupant was 
arrested will be found in the automobile may search for that evidence 
anywhere in the automobile where its presence is supported by probable 
                                                                                                                          
76 Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
77 Id. (“[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment 
at the time of the search.”). 
78 Id. (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
79 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799–800 (1982) (holding that police officer can search 
a vehicle without a warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding that police 
can conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe there is contraband in 
the car). 
80 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 & n.6 (1981) (finding that where a defendant’s “jacket 
was located inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the [defendant] had been a passenger 
just before he was arrested . . . [t]he jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was 
‘within the arrestee’s immediate control’ within the meaning of the Chimel  
case . . . [and therefore] there is no need here to consider whether the search and seizure were 
permissible under the so-called ‘automobile exception’”). 
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cause.
81
 
Albeit less understandable, reasonable suspicion would have at least 
been a term well established in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
practice.
82
  Reasonable suspicion has never justified a full evidentiary 
search.
83
  Instead, pursuant to the landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio,
84
 
reasonable suspicion justifies a “cursory” search for the limited purpose of 
ensuring that the suspect is not armed and dangerous.
85
  This Terry “pat 
down” was extended to the interior of an automobile in Michigan v. 
Long,
86
 where the Court held that a cursory search of the interior of an 
automobile is reasonable whenever a police officer has reasonable 
suspicion that there may be a weapon within ready access of a passenger 
allowed to re-enter the vehicle.
87
  However, because Justice Scalia used the 
term “reasonable belief” as the litmus test for an authorized warrantless  
search for evidence related to the arresting offense, it is difficult to 
reconcile that term with the more limited protective scope of Terry and 
Michigan.  Nonetheless, had the Court substituted “suspicion” for “belief,” 
it would have at least invoked an already established quantum of proof. 
The Court explicitly acknowledged that the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement, coupled with the Terry search exception, justified 
a search for evidence or for the protection of officer safety.
88
  The Court 
also concluded that these alternative search justifications “together ensure 
that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary 
concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle's recent occupant 
justify a search.”89 
Thus, as articulated, the holding of the case suggests that these are the 
exclusive justifications for searching the automobile of a recently arrested 
                                                                                                                          
81 See Ross, 456 U.S. at 799–800 (holding that police officers who have probable cause that there 
is contraband in a container in a vehicle may search the containers where such contraband may be, even 
if it is not in plain view, and rejecting the prior rule that if the police know that the contraband is in a 
container in the vehicle (as opposed to just somewhere in the vehicle), they must obtain a warrant to 
open the container). In other words, Ross held that once a container is placed in a vehicle, it is 
indistinguishable from the vehicle itself for purposes of the warrant exception. 
82 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (authorizing limited cursory searches where police 
harbored reasonable suspicion—rather than probable cause—of the presence of weapons). 
83 See id. at 25–26 (“A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, 
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.  
Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to 
harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a ‘full’ 
search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.” (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))). 
84 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
85 Id. at 30–31. 
86 463 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1983). 
87 Id. at 1036, 1050. 
88 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346–47 (2009). 
89 Id. at 347. 
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occupant: “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the 
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”90  However, drawing 
from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton the Court elaborated 
on the justification to search the car of an arrested recent occupant, which 
applies even when the suspect is secure and when Belton’s SITLA 
authority has terminated:  
[F]ollowing the suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion 
concurring in the judgment in that case, we also conclude 
that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a 
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.
91
 
The Court did not, however, explain what it meant by the term 
“reasonable belief,” a term it adopted from Justice Scalia's Thornton 
concurrence.  It therefore would be tempting to conclude that this term was 
merely a synonym for probable cause—that the Court merely highlighted 
the alternative existing “unique” automobile search justification pursuant 
to the Ross automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  However, 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Gant exacerbates the uncertainty 
related to the meaning of “reasonable belief,” the relevant portion of which 
provides: 
I would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso 
facto “reasonable” only when the object of the search is 
evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of 
another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe 
occurred.
92
  
There are two meanings that can be attributed to this explanation of 
automobile search authority.  Consistent with the existing range of 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the reference to probable cause 
could qualify the two distinct search objectives that Justice Scalia 
addresses: (1) search for evidence related to the arrested crime; or (2) 
search for any other evidence in the automobile based on probable cause.  
However, it is also plausible to read this portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion 
as distinguishing between these two search objectives, indicating that 
probable cause is required only when the object of the search is evidence 
unrelated to the crime for which the suspect was arrested.  This latter 
                                                                                                                          
90 Id. at 351. 
91 Id. at 335 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
92 Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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interpretation underscores the majority’s reliance on Justice Scalia’s 
Thornton concurrence in concluding that a search for evidence related to 
the crime of arrest is justified when the police have a “reasonable belief” 
that the evidence will be found in the automobile.
93
 
One conclusion seems indisputable: had the Court intended to 
emphasize the existing Ross automobile exception search authority, the 
opinion’s use of the term “reasonable belief” instead of probable cause 
becomes illogical.  It is also illogical to assume the Court intended 
reasonable belief to be a synonym for reasonable suspicion.  First, as 
already noted, reasonable suspicion had never before been understood as a 
substantive authority justifying an evidentiary search, which is exactly 
what the Gant reasonable belief standard permits.  Second, where the 
Court had previously extended the concept of reasonable suspicion to 
another context, it utilized that exact term and not some synonym.  In 
Richards v. Wisconsin,
94
 for example, the Court addressed the question of 
when it was reasonable for police to execute a warrant without first 
knocking and announcing their presence.
95
  The Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin had affirmed a trial court’s per se exception to the knock-and-
announce requirement for felony drug warrant execution.
96
  In overruling 
the decision, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority: 
In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their 
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective 
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence.  This standard—as opposed to a 
probable-cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance 
between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in 
the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy 
interests affected by no-knock entries.
97
 
The Court went on to state that although the reasonable suspicion 
threshold was not a high burden to meet, it was nonetheless necessary to 
justify the reasonableness of a no-knock entry.
98
  This extension of the 
reasonable suspicion quantum of cause to a context beyond the Terry 
investigatory stop situation suggests that where the Court intends to 
endorse such an extension, it will use the precise terminology of reasonable 
                                                                                                                          
93 See id. at 343 (majority opinion). 
94 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
95 Id. at 394. 
96 Id. at 389–90. 
97 Id. at 394. 
98 Id. at 394–95. 
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suspicion.  This, in turn, supports the alternate inference: that the Court’s 
use of the term “reasonable belief” was deliberate, and not a veiled 
invocation of the reasonable suspicion quantum.
99
 
IV.  LOWER COURT UNCERTAINTY:  REASONABLE SUSPICION, PROBABLE 
CAUSE, OR SOMETHING NEW? 
“Reasonable belief” has become a “nebulous standard” in continuing 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
100
  As Justice Alito correctly predicted 
in his Gant dissent, this new standard is “virtually certain to confuse law 
enforcement officers and judges for some time to come.”101  Not 
surprisingly, lower courts wrestling with the ultimate meaning of 
“reasonable belief” have come to myriad conclusions.  Some courts have 
determined that, outside of traffic violations, once a person is arrested and 
outside the vehicle, Gant allows the police to search the vehicle for further 
evidence of the crime for which he was arrested.
102
  Others see Gant as 
providing a per se test for “reasonable belief” based on the nature of the 
offense for which a suspect is arrested.
103
  In Reagan v. United States, the 
court found that “reasonable belief” requires a court to determine, based on 
common sense and the totality of the circumstances, whether the police had 
cause to believe there would be evidence of the offense of the arrest in the 
vehicle.
104
  In United States v. Page,
105
 the Fourth Circuit made a similar 
determination, relying, however, on the presence of other evidence to 
justify the search.
106
  As the Page court observed: 
[I]t would appear that the majority in Gant distinguishes 
between offenses for which it is unlikely that the arrestee’s 
vehicle contains relevant evidence, i.e., traffic violations, and 
offenses for which the recovery of such evidence is likely.  
The Court in Gant specifically cited drug offenses as 
illustrative of the exception to the rule announced.  
Accordingly, under the rationale in Gant, the seizure of a 
quantity of marijuana from the defendant, standing alone, 
                                                                                                                          
99 See id. at 385. 
100 United States v. Page, 679 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
101 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
102 E.g., Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 677–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Osborne, 96 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 705 (Cal. Ct. App.  2009).  
103 E.g., United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). 
104 Id. 
105 679 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
106 See id. at 654 (finding that seizure of drugs from the person of the defendant after he was 
stopped in the vehicle justified search of vehicle for drugs); see also Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863, 
875–76 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding that drugs in plain view in the vehicle justified search); State v. 
Snapp, 219 P.3d 971, 976–77 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that drugs in plain view and defendant's 
movements to hide something in car gave police reasonable belief to search for drugs in vehicle), rev’d, 
275 P.3d 289 (Wash. 2012). 
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justified the search of the passenger compartment of his 
vehicle.
107
  
This position seems both logical and in accordance with the Court’s 
annunciation in Gant.
108
  
Perhaps “reasonable belief” is a twin sibling of the lower evidentiary 
standard of “reasonable suspicion,” as espoused by the Colorado courts.  
Some courts have “concluded that by using language like ‘reasonable to 
believe’ and ‘reasonable basis to believe,’ the Supreme Court intended a 
degree of articulable suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for 
limited intrusions like investigatory stops.”109  In Perez v. People,110 the 
Colorado Supreme Court found a direct link between “reasonable belief” 
and the type of reasonable suspicion found in Terry v. Ohio
111
: “a 
reasonable belief to conduct such a search exists when there is a ‘degree of 
articulable suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited 
intrusions like investigatory stops.’”112  To support the assumption, it is 
noteworthy to observe that Terry, which gave life to “reasonable 
suspicion,” seemed to suggest in its opinion that the two were indeed part 
and parcel of the same concept: 
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a 
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police 
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with 
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime . . . . 
                                                                                                                          
107 Page, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 654.  Compare United States v. Joy, 336 F. App’x 337, 343 (4th Cir. 
2009) (holding that it may be reasonable to believe evidence relating to the drug offenses may be 
located in the vehicle), and United States v. Oliva, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57293 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 
2009) (holding that police could reasonably believe that evidence of defendant’s arrest for DWI could 
be found in the vehicle), with United States v. Megginson, 340 F. App’x 856, 857 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that arrest for domestic abuse did not justify search), and United States v. Majette, 326 F. 
App’x 211, 213 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that arrest for suspended operator’s license did not warrant 
search). 
108 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009) (“In many cases, as when a recent occupant 
is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains 
relevant evidence.  But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a 
basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein.” 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. Matias-Maestres, 738 F. Supp. 
2d 281, 293–96 (D.P.R. 2010) (holding that police could not have reasonable belief that evidence of 
driver’s DUI would be found on passenger). 
109 People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Colo. 2010); see also People v. Chamberlain, 229 
P.3d 1054, 1058 (Colo. 2010) (finding search incident to arrest for false reporting unreasonable where 
defendant was handcuffed and in backseat of police vehicle, police possessed defendant’s driver’s 
license listing her former address, her registration, and her proof of insurance, and it was not reasonable 
to believe that defendant’s vehicle might contain evidence relevant to false reporting). 
110 231 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2010). 
111 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
112 Perez, 231 P.3d at 961 (quoting McCarty, 229 P.3d at 1046). 
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[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger.
113
 
This rationale has repeatedly fallen on a receptive audience in the Colorado 
courts, which are much more in tune with the notion that “reasonable 
belief” equates to “reasonable suspicion.” 
The Court's use of phrases like “reasonable to believe” and “reasonable 
basis to believe” is a further indication that it intends some degree of 
articulable suspicion, a standard which it has previously acknowledged as 
meriting lawful intrusion in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  While 
this particular language is often used synonymously with probable cause, 
in light of the automobile exception—which already provides authority for 
a warrantless evidentiary search where police have probable cause to 
believe an automobile contains evidence of a crime—a requirement of 
probable cause in this context would render the entire second prong of the 
Gant SITLA exception superfluous.  The Colorado Supreme Court stated: 
“For this reason, and because the majority at several points requires only a 
reasonable belief that evidence ‘might’ be found, it seems more likely that 
the Court intended a lesser degree of suspicion commensurate with that 
sufficient for limited intrusions, like investigatory stops.”114 
While determining the meaning of “reasonable belief” in the Gant 
decision has been met with uncertainty and a lack of clarity, determining 
what “reasonable belief” is not has been less difficult.  The idea that Gant’s 
reasonable belief justification (the “evidentiary justification”) under an 
automobile-related SITLA is somehow synonymous with the probable 
cause requirement of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
has been dismissed by a number of lower court decisions, and to Justice 
Alito it was a key defect of the Gant majority opinion.
115
  In fact, as 
observed by the First Circuit, “every circuit that has considered the issue to 
date has either concluded or assumed that the auto exception survived 
under Gant . . . [and] the auto exception requires probable cause.  But the 
Gant evidentiary justification only requires a ‘reasonable basis.’  These 
distinctions make a difference.”116 
                                                                                                                          
113 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 
(1972) (“So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the 
suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective 
purpose.” (emphasis added)). 
114 Chamberlain, 229 P.3d at 1057.  But see State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650, 665 (Utah 2010) (“[A]n 
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous . . . does not create automatic 
authorization for officers to conduct a [Terry] frisk.”). 
115 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 364 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Why . . . is the standard for this 
type of evidence-gathering search ‘reason to believe’ rather than probable cause?”). 
116 United States v. Polanco, 634 F. 3d 39, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Arriaza, 
401 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Aguilera, 625 F.3d 482, 485–86 (8th Cir. 2010); 
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When coupled with Justice Scalia’s less than clear discussion of the 
range of automobile search justifications, understanding this new term that 
has been injected into the automobile search equation requires analysis that 
drills deeper than the opinion itself to its apparent origin: United States v. 
Rabinowitz
117
 and the Court’s early clarification of the SITLA exception. 
V.  THORNTON AND THE BIRTH OF ”REASONABLE BELIEF” 
As the Gant majority notes, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
Thornton v. United States
118
 first introduced the concept of “reasonable 
belief” into the automobile SITLA equation.119  In Thornton, a police 
officer observed suspicious behavior by the driver (Thornton) of an 
automobile.
120
  The officer followed the suspect to a parking lot.  Unlike in 
Belton, the police officer did not immediately approach the vehicle.  
Instead, he waited for the suspect to exit the vehicle.  The officer then 
approached Thornton and asked him several investigatory questions.  His 
suspicion was aroused that Thornton might be armed and dangerous, so the 
officer performed a Terry search of Thornton, which led to the discovery 
of narcotics on Thornton’s person.  At that point, Thornton was placed 
under arrest, and the officer searched the interior compartment of 
Thornton’s vehicle, in which he found a firearm.121 
Thornton sought to suppress the firearm as fruit of an unreasonable 
search.
122
  The government responded that the search was justified 
pursuant to Belton’s SITLA exception.123  The evidence was admitted and 
Thornton was convicted.
124
  The case reached the Supreme Court on the 
question of whether a Belton SITLA applied when the police arrest an 
automobile occupant after the occupant exits the vehicle.
125
  The Court 
concluded that requiring the police to approach the suspect while still in 
the vehicle created an unnecessary risk to law enforcement officers.
126
  
                                                                                                                          
United States v. Hinojosa, 392 F. App’x 260 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Stotler, 591 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
117 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
118 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
119 See id. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would . . . limit Belton searches to cases where it is 
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” (emphasis 
added)). 
120 Id. at 617 (majority opinion) (“Officer Deion Nichols of the Norfolk, Virginia, Police 
Department, who was in uniform but driving an unmarked police car, first noticed petitioner Marcus 
Thornton when petitioner slowed down so as to avoid driving next to him.”). 
121 Id. at 618.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 618–19. 
124 Id. at 619. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 621–22 (“[U]nder the strictures of petitioner’s proposed ‘contact initiation’ rule, officers 
who do so would be unable to search the car’s passenger compartment in the event of a custodial arrest, 
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Accordingly, it held that Belton applied not only when the suspect was 
arrested in the automobile, but also to the arrest of recent automobile 
occupants.
127
   
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia expressed his overall 
dissatisfaction with the automobile SITLA exception.
128
  Essentially laying 
the groundwork for Gant, he emphasized that Belton had become a blank 
check, allowing the police to search automobiles after the arrest of an 
occupant—and now even a recent occupant—irrespective of the presence 
of factors related to the original rationale for the SITLA exception, such as 
the risk that evidence will be destroyed or that the suspect will be able to 
access a weapon to endanger the police.
129
  For Justice Scalia, the issue 
was not whether the suspect was arrested in the automobile or after having 
exited the automobile; the issue was whether the facts supported any 
plausible exigency justifying application of the SITLA exception.
130
  In 
short, Justice Scalia rejected the “bright line” Belton rule that the presence 
of the automobile in the equation ipso facto created an exigency justifying 
a SITLA, no matter how minor the offense of arrest, or how secure the 
arrestee.
131
 
Justice Scalia then articulated his alternative vision for the proper 
tailoring of the Belton automobile SITLA exception.  Unsurprisingly, this 
focused on the original SITLA exception and the exigencies that justified 
dispensing with the warrant and probable cause requirements for 
conducting a search following arrest.
132
  As it originally did in Chimel v. 
California,
133
 the Court endorsed the SITLA based on the historic practice 
of police conducting a search of a suspect’s person in order to seize any 
evidence in the suspect’s possession—thereby protecting it from 
destruction—and to ensure the suspect did not have a secreted weapon that 
could endanger the police.
134
  In Chimel, the Court concluded that any 
intrusion resulting from the SITLA was incidental to the already more 
                                                                                                                          
potentially compromising their safety and placing incriminating evidence at risk of concealment or 
destruction.  The Fourth Amendment does not require such a gamble.”). 
127 Id. at 622. 
128 See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The consequence of Belton’s bright line rule is that] 
we have now abandoned our constitutional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of 
purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for 
the search are allowed to rummage around in a car to see what they might find.” (quoting United States 
v.  McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J., concurring))). 
129 See id. at 631 (“Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a mere application of Chimel. 
Rather, it is a return to the broader sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel—
limited, of course, to searches of motor vehicles, a category of ‘effects’ which give rise to a reduced 
expectation of privacy, and heightened law enforcement needs.” (internal citation omitted)). 
130 Id. at 625–28. 
131 See id. at 625. 
132 Id. at 632. 
133 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
134 Id. at 763. 
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substantial intrusion of arrest.
135
  Accordingly, so long as the arrest was 
lawful, the search incident to the arrest produced no further offense to the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Chimel was, however, a double-edged sword.  In Chimel, following the 
arrest, the police searched Chimel’s person, the drawers and closets in the 
bedroom where he was arrested, and other areas of the house wherein he 
was arrested.
136
  The Court held that the search of Chimel and the area 
within his immediate control, or “wingspan,” was reasonable, for that was 
the area from which Chimel might be able to gain access to a weapon or 
evidence.
137
  However, the Court also held that the police exceeded the 
reasonable scope of the SITLA when they searched areas outside the room 
in which he was arrested because there was simply no exigency to justify 
such an expansive scope.
138
 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Belton automobile variant of the 
SITLA focused on the exigency foundation.  More specifically, Justice 
Scalia attacked the most troubling aspect of the Belton decision:  the 
Court’s holding that application of the SITLA exception to an automobile 
would not depend on a case-by-case assessment of the presence of the 
Chimel exigency considerations, but instead would be applied as a “bright 
line” rule.139  In short, Justice Scalia took issue with the fact that Belton 
had created an automatic search authority for automobiles that applied 
even in the absence of the slightest exigency to justify the search; this was 
a concern also highlighted by Justice O’Connor in Thornton when she 
noted in her concurrence that “lower court decisions seem now to treat the 
ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a 
police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin 
rationales of Chimel.”140 
Justice Scalia first noted the obvious: that the bright line authority to 
conduct an automobile SITLA established in Belton had become totally 
untethered from the original Chimel justifications: 
As one judge has put it: “[I]n our search for clarity, we have 
now abandoned our constitutional moorings and floated to a 
place where the law approves of purely exploratory searches 
of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective 
or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a 
                                                                                                                          
135 See id. at 776 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he invasion and disruption of a man’s life and 
privacy which stem from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor intrusions 
attending a search of his premises.”). 
136 Id. at 754 (majority opinion). 
137 Id. at 768. 
138 Id. 
139 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
140 Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
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car to see what they might find.”  I agree entirely with that 
assessment.
141
 
Instead of an outright rejection of this expansive application of Belton, 
Justice Scalia took a different tack: he offered an alternative justification 
for the scope of the Belton search authority.  He reasoned: “If Belton 
searches are justifiable, it is not because the arrestee might grab a weapon 
or evidentiary item from his car, but simply because the car might contain 
evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested.”142  This one 
sentence opened a new front in the automobile search battle that would 
evolve and culminate with the Gant decision.  It also sowed the seed for 
the “reasonable belief” justification adopted by the Gant majority. 
Justice Scalia’s explanation of this alternative theory of Belton’s 
automobile search authority is essential to understanding the meaning of 
“reasonable belief” adopted by the Gant majority.  According to his 
Thornton concurrence, courts had historically endorsed the search for 
evidence related to the crime of arrest, indicating that such searches had 
always been considered reasonable: “Numerous earlier authorities support 
this approach, referring to the general interest in gathering evidence related 
to the crime of arrest with no mention of the more specific interest in 
preventing its concealment or destruction.”143  Furthermore, endorsement 
of these searches had nothing to do with concerns over the safety of police 
officers or the risk that the evidence might be destroyed—the two 
foundational pillars of the Chimel SITLA.  It is therefore clear that Justice 
Scalia regarded the search for evidence related to the crime of arrest as 
justified on a wholly independent basis from the SITLA that Belton 
extended to automobiles.  Because this search justification is not 
contingent on the SITLA exigency concerns, it is both automatic and 
broader in scope than Justice Scalia’s conception of a legitimate SITLA, a 
fact he had no difficulty endorsing: 
There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to 
search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a 
crime is lawfully arrested.  The fact of prior lawful arrest 
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and 
distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from general 
rummaging.  Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that 
evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the 
suspect was apprehended.
144
 
This was not intended to suggest that Chimel’s SITLA authority was 
                                                                                                                          
141 Id. at 628–29 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
142 Id. at 629. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 630. 
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invalid.  Indeed, Justice Scalia emphasized that “Chimel’s [automobile 
SITLA exception which focuses on] concealment or destruction of 
evidence also has historical support.”145  Instead, his discussion of 
evidentiary searches related to the crime of arrest seemed clearly intended 
to offer a more logical rationale for the expansive application of Chimel to 
the automobile context.  Again, from his opinion: 
[I]f we are going to continue to allow Belton searches on 
stare decisis grounds, we should at least be honest about why 
we are doing so.  Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a 
mere application of Chimel.  Rather, it is a return to the 
broader sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed 
before Chimel . . . .
146
 
In using the term “reasonable belief,” the Gant Court ultimately embraced 
the honesty Justice Scalia demanded.  Accordingly, “reasonable belief” can 
only be understood in the broader context of the type of evidentiary search 
Justice Scalia invoked in support of the continued validity of Belton—not a 
variant of a Chimel search, but instead an evidentiary search rendered 
reasonable by some alternative justification. 
This analysis hearkens back to the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Rabinowitz.
147
  In Rabinowitz, police officers suspected the 
defendant of unlawfully selling forged postage stamps.
148
  Based on his 
sale of stamps to an undercover officer, the police obtained a warrant for 
his arrest.
149
  However, they did not obtain a search warrant.
150
  Rabinowitz 
was subsequently arrested at his place of business: an office.
151
  
Immediately following his arrest, police searched Rabinowitz and his 
office—including his desk, safe, and file cabinets—and seized 573 forged 
stamps.  He was indicted for possessing and concealing the stamps so 
seized and for selling the four that had been purchased.  The seized stamps 
were admitted in evidence over his objection, and he was convicted on 
both counts.
152
  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the search 
was unreasonable solely because the police had a prior opportunity to 
obtain a search warrant—a basis subsequently rejected by the Supreme 
Court, but outside of the scope of this discussion.
153
 
The Supreme Court determined that the search conducted 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 631. 
147 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
148 Id. at 57. 
149 Id. at 57–58. 
150 Id. at 59. 
151 Id. at 58. 
152 Id. at 59. 
153 Id. 
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contemporaneously with Rabinowitz’s arrest was reasonable and 
accordingly reversed the court of appeals’ decision.154  The Court 
emphasized, however, that “[w]hat is a reasonable search is not to be 
determined by any fixed formula. . . . The recurring questions of the 
reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and 
circumstances of each case.”155  Although it decided Rabinowitz prior to its 
seminal SITLA decision in Chimel v. California,
156
 the Court nonetheless 
focused on the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.157  The Court 
concluded that the nature of the business office justified the conclusion that 
the entire room was within Rabinowitz’s immediate control, and therefore 
held that the entire search fell within the SITLA exception.
158
 
While the search of Rabinowitz himself certainly met the notion of an 
area within his immediate control,
159
 the search of his file cabinet (where 
the stamps were found) is almost impossible to square with this limitation.  
The Court seemed unconcerned with the distinction, indicating that its 
conception of “immediate control” was more expansive than that which 
would be endorsed by Chimel decades later.
160
  Indeed, the ability to gain 
ready access to the file cabinet seemed far less significant in Rabinowitz 
than did the assumption that evidence of a crime is often found in the area 
within the possession of the arrested suspect. 
Despite invoking the SITLA doctrine to justify the search in 
Rabinowitz, it seems relatively clear that the Court viewed the scope of that 
authority quite differently than did the Court in the subsequent Chimel 
decision.  In Rabinowitz, the Court was obviously willing to endorse a 
scope that included the entire office.
161
  The rationale for this expansive 
                                                                                                                          
154 Id. at 63–64, 66.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on a series of cases, including 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).  
See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61 (citing Weeks and Agnello for the propositions that it is reasonable “to 
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as 
its fruits or as the means by which it was committed,” Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392, and “[t]he right without 
a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to 
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as 
its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an 
escape from custody, is not to be doubted,” Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30). 
155 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63. 
156 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
157 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63–64. 
158 Id. at 64. 
159 Id. at 60 (“[N]o one questions the right, without a search warrant, to search the person after a 
valid arrest.  The right to search the person incident to arrest always has been recognized in this country 
and in England.  Where one had been placed in the custody of the law by valid action of officers, it was 
not unreasonable to search him.” (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392)). 
160 Chimel only authorizes such contemporaneous searches in order to seize weapons or other 
evidence that may be used to effect an escape, or to prevent the destruction of evidence.  See Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969). 
161 Id.  
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scope was clearly based not on the type of exigency presumptively 
associated with arrest, but instead on the mere fact that the offense was 
committed in the location of arrest such that it was likely that evidence of 
the offense could be found in that location.  Indeed, the Court noted that 
the authority for the search was based on both denial of the means to effect 
escape and the traditionally accepted goal of discovering evidence of the 
offense: 
The right “to search the place where the arrest is made in 
order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its 
fruits or as the means by which it was committed” seems to 
have stemmed not only from the acknowledged authority to 
search the person, but also from the longstanding practice of 
searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the 
accused found upon arrest.  It became accepted that the 
premises where the arrest was made, which premises were 
under the control of the person arrested and where the crime 
was being committed, were subject to search without a search 
warrant.  Such a search was not “unreasonable.”162 
Including the “premises where the arrest was made” within the scope of 
SITLA was therefore based on a reasonable linkage between the nature of 
the offense and the type of evidence searched for and seized.
163
  The Court 
cited another example to emphasize this point: 
In Marron v. United States, the officers had a warrant to 
search for liquor, but the warrant did not describe a certain 
ledger and invoices pertaining to the operation of the 
business.  The latter were seized during the search of the 
place of business but were not returned on the search 
warrant, as they were not described therein.  The offense of 
maintaining a nuisance under the National Prohibition Act 
was being committed in the room by the arrested bartender in 
the officers’ presence.  The search warrant was held not to 
cover the articles seized, but the arrest for the offense being 
committed in the presence of the officers was held to 
authorize the search for and seizure of the ledger and 
invoices, this Court saying: “The officers were authorized to 
arrest for crime being committed in their presence, and they 
lawfully arrested Birdsall.  They had a right without a 
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to 
find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal 
                                                                                                                          
162 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
163 Id.  
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enterprise. . . . The closet in which liquor and the ledger were 
found was used as a part of the saloon.  And, if the ledger 
was not as essential to the maintenance of the establishment 
as were bottles, liquors and glasses, it was nonetheless a part 
of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the 
offense.  And, while it was not on Birdsall’s person at the 
time of his arrest, it was in his immediate possession and 
control.  The authority of officers to search and seize the 
things by which the nuisance was being maintained extended 
to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose.”164 
The Rabinowitz Court then noted that, as long as the object of the 
search was rationally related to the offense of arrest, it was sufficiently 
distinguishable from an unreasonable general search: 
[Prior] cases condemned general exploratory searches, which 
cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant.  
In the instant case the search was not general or exploratory 
for whatever might be turned up.  Specificity was the mark of 
the search and seizure here.  There was probable cause to 
believe that respondent was conducting his business illegally.  
The search was for stamps overprinted illegally, which were 
thought upon the most reliable information to be in the 
possession of and concealed by respondent in the very room 
where he was arrested, over which room he had immediate 
control and in which he had been selling such stamps 
unlawfully.
165
 
In further support of its assessment of reasonable scope, the Court cited 
Harris v. United States,
166
 a case that involved a SITLA that extended 
throughout the arrestee’s apartment and lasted for five hours.167  In 
concluding that the search was reasonable, the Court emphasized the 
relationship between the nature of the offense and the objects of the search: 
Nor can support be found for the suggestion that the search 
could not validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner 
was arrested.  Petitioner was in exclusive possession of a four 
room apartment.  His control extended quite as much to the 
bedroom in which the draft cards were found as to the living 
room in which he was arrested.  The canceled checks and 
                                                                                                                          
164 Rabinowitz 339 U.S. at 61–62 (citations omitted) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 
192, 198–99 (1927)). 
165 Id. at 62–63. 
166 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
167 Id. at 149. 
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other instrumentalities of the crimes charged in the warrants 
could easily have been concealed in any of the four rooms of 
the apartment. . . . [T]he area which reasonably may be 
subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous 
circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room, as 
contrasted to some other room of the apartment.
168
 
While even here the Court invoked the “immediate control” rationale 
of SITLA,
169
 it seems to reflect a fiction; few would consider the entire 
apartment of an arrestee to be within his “immediate control” after he is 
placed in custody.  Nonetheless, by characterizing the location of the arrest 
as a “fortuitous” factor,170 the Court appeared more interested in 
authorizing the search for evidence related to the offense at the location of 
the arrest than in any exigency related to the arrestee’s ability to access 
(and potentially destroy) such evidence, a theory obviously central to the 
Rabinowitz holding.
171
 
Justice Scalia’s “reasonable belief” concept—a concept ultimately 
adopted by the Gant majority—can only be understood in light of this line 
of decisions.  Unlike the earlier decisions he invoked, Justice Scalia 
confronted a barrier against merely including within the scope of a SITLA 
the entire area in which a suspect was arrested:  Chimel viewed the “area of 
immediate control” as more limited than the area considered within that 
scope in these earlier decisions.  As noted above, by the time Thornton was 
decided (long after Chimel), immediate control had become synonymous 
with lunging distance, or wingspan, of the arrestee.  Accordingly, Justice 
Scalia was apparently compelled to develop an alternative theory to 
resurrect the type of evidentiary search justified by the much broader scope 
of the SITLA applied in Rabinowitz and its progeny. 
VI.  THE GANT BALANCE SHEET 
There is no question that on the surface, Gant appears to severely 
curtail the authority of police to conduct an automobile SITLA following 
arrest of a vehicle occupant or recent occupant.
172
  While Gant did not 
                                                                                                                          
168 Id. at 152. 
169 See id. (upholding SITLA despite it having spanned an entire apartment). 
170 Id. 
171 See id. at 152–53 (“The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search 
for two small canceled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen 
automobile or an illegal still.  We do not believe that the search in this case went beyond that which the 
situation reasonably demanded.”); Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63 (“Harris . . . is ample authority for the 
more limited search here considered.” (citation omitted)). 
172 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to 
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”). 
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overrule Belton, a footnote in the majority opinion indicates that, although 
still breathing, Belton is on life support: 
Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest 
of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an 
officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real 
possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.  But in 
such a case a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.
173
 
The message is clear:  it will be a rare case where the situation results in 
the type of genuine access to the automobile necessary to justify 
application of Belton. 
This, however, does not mean a search contemporaneous with the 
arrest of a vehicle occupant or recent occupant will now almost invariably 
be considered unreasonable.
174
  In fact, quite the opposite is true.  First, the 
pre-existing search justifications resulting from probable cause (for a full 
evidence search) or reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains a 
weapon (for a cursory Terry interior sweep) are totally unaffected by 
Gant.
175
  In fact, the opinion emphasizes the continuing validity of these 
well-established theories of reasonableness.
176
  However, it is the inclusion 
of Justice Scalia’s “reasonable belief” concept that will significantly 
impact future automobile searches. 
Assuming the police arrest a suspect after approaching her in a vehicle 
or soon after she exits the vehicle, Gant essentially presumes that the 
apprehension will result in restraint sufficient to eliminate any SITLA 
justification.
177
  Unless someone else will be permitted to return to the 
                                                                                                                          
173 Id. at 343 n.4 (citation omitted). 
174 See id. at 346 (stating that a broad reading of Belton is unnecessary to protect officers in light 
of the many other exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
175 Id. at 346–47. 
176 See id. (“Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search 
under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand.  For instance, Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he 
has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is dangerous and might access 
the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons.  If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle 
contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982), authorizes a 
search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. . . . Finally, there may be still 
other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search.  Cf. Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that, incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited 
protective sweep of those areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be 
hiding)” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
177 Id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  When these justifications 
are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show 
that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.”). 
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vehicle to drive it away from the scene (such as a passenger who was not 
arrested), the police will have no basis to conduct an interior sweep for 
weapons pursuant to Michigan v. Long.
178
  If the police have probable 
cause to believe that evidence is in the vehicle, then the Belton/Gant line of 
authority becomes essentially irrelevant because of the alternate authority 
to conduct a probable cause search of the vehicle without first obtaining a 
warrant.
179
  However, what happens if none of these authorities are 
triggered? 
At this point, a “reasonable . . . [belief] the vehicle contains evidence 
of the offense of arrest” becomes decisive.180  That belief justifies a full 
search of the vehicle for that evidence.
181
  Reasonable belief therefore 
cannot be analogous to probable cause (because the Gant Court recognized 
that probable cause provides an independent basis for the evidentiary 
search),
182
 or reasonable suspicion (because reasonable suspicion has never 
justified a full evidentiary search).
183
  Instead, reasonable belief is best 
understood as a tether—both historical and practical.  Historically, it 
represents a tether back to the originally broad scope of SITLA central to 
Harris and Rabinowitz, but subsequently narrowed by Chimel.  Practically, 
it is a tether that connects the probable cause for the arrest to the search for 
the evidence—a tether because it presupposes the absence of independent 
probable cause to conduct the search (which would obviate the need for the 
“reasonable belief” justification). 
Accordingly, “reasonable belief” is best understood as a hybrid 
between a procedural and substantive justification for reasonable 
government action.  The link it establishes between the justification for the 
arrest and the justification for the subsequent vehicle search reflects the 
procedural nature of the concept—in effect extending the justification for 
the arrest to the search for evidence of the arrest.  However, the concept 
includes a modest yet important substantive aspect:  the requirement that 
the linkage between the arrest and the evidence searched for be reasonable. 
This substantive element does not, however, seem analogous to either 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for one critical reason: there is no 
requirement that the belief be based on any articulable fact that evidence is 
                                                                                                                          
178 463 U.S. 1032, 1052–53 (1983) (extending the concept of a Terry frisk to the interior of a 
vehicle when the police have reasonable suspicion that someone can rapidly access a weapon inside the 
vehicle). 
179 See, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (authorizing a warrantless probable cause 
search of any area of a vehicle in which evidence of criminal activity might be found). 
180 Gant, 556 U.S. at 346. 
181 Id. at 343. 
182 See id. at 347 (“If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal 
activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the 
vehicle in which the evidence might be found.”). 
183 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969). 
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in the automobile.  Instead, the mere nature of the offense of arrest is what 
ostensibly renders the belief reasonable.
184
  That it is the nature of the 
arrested offense and not any individualized articulable fact that establishes 
reasonable belief seems almost indisputable after considering the genesis 
of the concept.  By reaching back to Harris and Rabinowitz, Justice Scalia 
almost unquestionably resurrected the aspect of those decisions later 
overruled by Chimel
185
: that the mere nature of the offense, and not the risk 
of evidence destruction, danger to the police, or articulable facts 
establishing probable cause is what justifies the broader scope of the search 
associated with the arrest.
186
 
Notably, Gant’s holding limits the “reasonable belief” standard to 
automobile searches, demonstrating the minimal nature of the substantive 
aspect of reasonable belief.  In its endorsement of Justice Scalia’s Thornton 
concept, the Court emphasized that limitation.
187
  It is a well-established 
aspect of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that automobiles are afforded a 
reduced expectation of privacy.
188
  This reduced expectation lies at the core 
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as well as the 
extension of that exception to containers contained within an 
automobile.
189
  Accordingly, it seems significant that the Court limited the 
scope of a “reasonable belief” search to the automobile, and did not extend 
it to any area within the arrestee’s possession (which would have been 
more consistent with Justice Scalia’s Thornton reliance on Harris and 
                                                                                                                          
184 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343–44 (“In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a 
traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence.  
But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the 
passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” (citations omitted)). 
185 See Jack Blum, Note, Arizona v. Gant: Missing an Opportunity to Banish Bright Lines from 
the Court’s Vehicular Search Incident to Arrest Jurisprudence, 70 MD. L. REV. 826, 826 (claiming that 
the Gant Court should have restored an exigency-based standard similar to that in Chimel when it 
deviated from the previous bright-line standard set forth in Belton and that the Court’s failure to do so 
created an unacceptably vague precedent). 
186 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).  I use 
“associated” because Chimel precludes characterizing this expanded scope as an aspect of a SITLA. 
187 See Gant, 556 U.S. at 332–33 (“Although it does not follow from Chimel, circumstances 
unique to the automobile context also justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable 
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
188 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1985) (“When a vehicle is being used on the 
highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for 
residential purposestemporary or otherwisethe two justifications for the vehicle exception come 
into play.  First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually 
moving.  Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor 
vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling.” (footnote omitted)). 
189 See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1979) (discussing privacy levels with respect 
to suitcases in automobiles). 
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Rabinowitz).
190
  While the Court is obviously willing to tolerate an 
expanded search authority in relation to a recent arrestee’s automobile, the 
opinion does not (at least explicitly) indicate an analogous tolerance for 
other areas within an arrestee’s possession, such as her home. 
Ultimately, revealing the full extent of Gant’s “reasonable belief” 
search authority will depend on further jurisprudence.
191
  Is a reasonable 
belief established solely by the nature of the crime of arrest, or is some 
additional quantum of proof required?  If based solely on the offense, what 
offenses create such reasonable belief?  What is the scope of the 
automobile search authority triggered by reasonable belief?  Is it, like the 
Belton SITLA, restricted to the interior compartment of the automobile?  
Or does it extend to any part of the automobile where evidence may be 
found (like the trunk)?  Will a reasonable belief justify a post-arrest search 
of other areas within an arrestee’s possession, such as a home or office?  
Does the authority extend to all containers in the automobile?
192
  If, as 
proposed herein, reasonable belief is indeed a new search justification, 
these questions of scope and substance become unavoidable.  At this point, 
one thing seems clear:  Gant is a genuine double-edged sword in the realm 
of search justification. 
A.  The Good (for Police) 
By qualifying the constriction of Belton’s SITLA authority with the 
concept of reasonable belief,
193
 the Supreme Court did not, as many 
assumed, inflict a mortal blow to post-arrest vehicle searches; Gant’s 
impact was anything but such a blow.  First, as noted by the Court, existing 
exceptions to the warrant and/or probable cause requirements continue to 
provide police with substantial vehicle search authority.
194
  However, 
police now also have search authority derived from the nature of the 
offense for which the suspect is arrested.  Looking to the pre-Chimel 
jurisprudence that Justice Scalia relies on as the foundation for his 
                                                                                                                          
190 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring) (relying on the general interest in 
gathering relevant evidence).  Neither Rabinowitz nor Harris involved a search of a suspect’s vehicle.  
Rabinowitz involved the search of a one-room office for counterfeit stamps, while Harris involved the 
search of an apartment and its contents for stolen checks. 
191 See George M. Dery III, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court Relapses into Search 
Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (discussing how the 
Court’s decision in Gant offered very little guidance in terms of proximity, limits, and applicability and 
left the many unclear aspects of the Gant decision for future courts to interpret, thereby undermining 
the legitimacy of law enforcement activities). 
192 Considering that both the Belton SITLA and the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement permit the search of containers in the vehicle, it is almost inconceivable that this question 
will be answered in the negative. 
193 See Arizona v.  Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (describing the concept of reasonable belief 
under Belton). 
194 Id. at 346. 
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“reasonable belief” concept, the range of offenses that will trigger this 
search authority appears to be quite broad.
195
 
A vehicle search based on “reasonable belief” that evidence is located 
in the vehicle will unquestionably provide police lawful access to the 
vehicle’s interior.  As a result, when linked to the plain view doctrine,196 
this aspect of Gant’s vehicle search authority provides an additional benefit 
for police.  So long as the extent of the vehicle search is proper in its scope, 
any evidence or contraband discovered may be seized, irrespective of 
whether it is evidence of the crime of arrest.  Nor is there any reason to 
assume that “reasonable belief” search authority does not extend to the 
trunk of the automobile.  Because the foundation of this search authority 
differs from the protective search foundation of SITLA, restricting the 
scope to the interior compartment (like SITLA) would be illogical.  So 
long as evidence related to the crime of arrest might be in the trunk, the 
trunk would be within proper scope.  The same logic would apply to 
containers inside the automobile, so long as evidence of the crime of arrest 
might be found in those containers. 
The net result of all of these considerations is that contrary to the 
restrictive tone of Gant, the “reasonable belief” prong of the decision will 
in fact often expand police search authority.  Furthermore, because lawful 
vantage point and access to seize contraband then triggers the plain view 
doctrine,
197
 associated seizure authority will not be limited to evidence of 
the crime of arrest, but will extend to any contraband or evidence 
discovered in plain view while searching for evidence of the crime of 
arrest.  However, there is one context where Gant will modify police 
authority to conduct post-arrest vehicle searches.  Ironically, this 
modification will effectively nullify an authority not even addressed in the 
Gant opinion: the pretextual arrest. 
B.  The Good (for the Public) 
If the range of offenses triggering a “reasonable belief” that evidence 
                                                                                                                          
195 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Rather, it is a return to the broader 
sort of search incident to arrest that we allowed before Chimel—limited, of course, to searches of motor 
vehicles, a category of ‘effects’ which give rise to a reduced expectation of privacy and heightened law 
enforcement needs.” (citations omitted)). 
196 The plain view doctrine permits a warrantless seizure of evidence and contraband discovered 
in plain view during a lawful observation.  See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) 
(“It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view 
without a warrant.”); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 
465); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 131 (1990) (discussing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465). 
197 See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–37 (1990) (requiring a police officer seizing evidence in plain 
view (i) to be lawfully present at the place where the evidence can be plainly viewed; (ii) to have a 
lawful right of access to the object; and (iii) that the incriminating character of the object is 
immediately apparent). 
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related to the offense will be in the automobile is quite broad, the value of 
restricting the Belton SITLA might appear questionable.  However, there is 
one type of situation where Gant will significantly curtail police search 
authority:  what the Court previously characterized as a pretextual arrest.  
In limiting police search authority, Gant provides some protection for an 
individual’s limited expectation of privacy in his vehicle.  In United States 
v. Robinson,
198
 the Supreme Court held that any lawful arrest triggers the 
authority to conduct a SITLA, irrespective of the subjective motive of the 
arresting officer.
199
  In that case, the defendant argued that his arrest for a 
minor traffic infraction was in fact motivated by the arresting officer’s 
desire to conduct a SITLA, and therefore was pretextual.
200
  Because a 
reasonable officer would rarely arrest an individual for such a minor 
offense, the defendant argued that the subsequent SITLA was 
unreasonable.
201
 
Rejecting this argument, the Court established a bright line trigger for 
the SITLA: lawful arrest.
202
  Motive for arrest is simply irrelevant, as long 
as the arrest was authorized by law and was conducted pursuant to valid 
probable cause.
203
  The defendant (and the dissent) argued that this ruling 
would effectively provide police with a blank check for searching vehicles 
because existing statutes allow for arrest for such a wide variety of traffic 
violations.
204
  The Court, however, was unpersuaded that this reality 
justified a case-by-case assessment of the propriety of the arrest or the 
necessity for the SITLA.
205
  The Court prohibited lower courts from 
probing any possible pretext for the arrest.  Reasoning that the police 
would be concerned that their justification for the arrest would be 
subjected to subsequent judicial scrutiny, the Court rejected a rule that 
would place police at risk by causing them to hesitate in conducting 
SITLAs.
206
  The term “pretextual arrest,” therefore, while a factual reality 
                                                                                                                          
198 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
199 Id. at 235. 
200 See id. at 221 n.1 (“Respondent argued below that Jenks may have used the subsequent traffic 
violation arrest as a mere pretext for a narcotics search which would not have been allowed by a neutral 
magistrate had Jenks sought a warrant.”). 
201 Id. 
202 See id. at 235 (“It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and 
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that 
Amendment.”). 
203 See id. at 226 (“Thus, the broadly stated rule, and the reasons for it, have been repeatedly 
affirmed in the decisions of this Court since Weeks v. United States, supra, nearly 60 years ago.  Since 
the statements in the cases speak not simply in terms of an exception to the warrant requirement, but in 
terms of an affirmative authority to search, they clearly imply that such searches also meet the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness.”). 
204 Id. at 235. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
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in the view of many, is a legal oxymoron. 
Gant, however, has substantially altered this conclusion.  It is clear that 
the decision in no way modified Robinson’s holding that the subjective 
motive of an arresting officer is irrelevant to assessing the propriety of a 
SITLA.  However, Gant’s impact on the ability to use an arrest for traffic 
infractions as the trigger for a SITLA is profound.  Because evidence 
related to a traffic offense will rarely, if ever, be in the vehicle itself, 
SITLA authority will terminate once the arrested driver or passenger is 
under effective police control—a situation the Gant Court indicated would 
rarely not be the case.  This control will eliminate any legitimate need to 
search the vehicle in order to secure any weapons within the arrestee’s 
lunging distance.  The only other justification for a vehicle search 
following Gant would be reasonable belief that evidence related to the 
offense will be in the vehicle, which will rarely be the case in relation to 
traffic offenses.  Indeed, Gant is an example of how traffic related offenses 
do not trigger such reasonable belief.  Accordingly, whether as a pretext to 
gain the opportunity to search a suspect’s vehicle, or as a legitimate 
exercise of police authority, traffic related arrests will no longer justify a 
search of the arrestee’s vehicle absent some alternative exception to the 
warrant and/or probable cause requirements. 
Traffic offense arrests are precisely the type of offenses that previously 
offered police a pretext to conduct an exploratory search of an automobile 
without probable cause.  Limiting post-arrest search authority in relation to 
such offenses is, as the Court emphasized in Gant, an important step 
forward in reconnecting the automobile SITLA with the reasonableness 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.
207
  Thus, although the Court in no 
way addressed the continued validity of Robinson, the effect of its decision 
will in large measure achieve the relief that was sought but denied in 
Robinson.  Like Gant himself, future suspects arrested for traffic 
infractions will be protected from reliance on those offenses as a 
justification for a general search of their automobiles. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Reconnecting the automobile SITLA with the underpinnings of the 
original SITLA exception—denying a recently arrested suspect access to 
evidence and/or weapons—was the primary focus of the Gant decision.  
This aspect of the decision nullified a troubling legal fiction that enabled 
police to transform any arrest of a vehicle occupant or recent occupant to a 
general search of the vehicle, unsupported by any individualized suspicion. 
While Belton’s automobile SITLA authority was not eliminated, as the 
Court noted, the likelihood that most arrested vehicle occupants would 
                                                                                                                          
207 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344–47 (2009). 
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rarely retain the type of genuine access to the automobile to trigger Belton 
indicates that the true automobile SITLA will now be a rare occurrence.
208
 
Had the Gant majority limited the decision to this constriction of the 
Belton automobile SITLA, a clear range of automobile search options 
would have emerged, all of which would have been based on well-
established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  In the rare situations where 
an arrested vehicle occupant retained genuine access to the vehicle interior, 
police would be authorized to search the vehicle interior pursuant to 
Belton.  In most situations, where the control over the arrestee deprives 
him of such access, probable cause that evidence is in the vehicle would 
trigger the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and thereby 
allow police to search the vehicle for such evidence, subject to the 
limitations imposed based on the nature of the evidence.  Even without 
probable cause to search for evidence or genuine concern that the arrestee 
or another individual will gain access to the vehicle interior, reasonable 
suspicion that another individual will gain ready access to a weapon once 
the vehicle is released will allow police to conduct a cursory “sweep” of 
the vehicle interior to ensure their safety.  Finally, if the vehicle is 
impounded as an incident to the arrest, it will almost always result in an 
inventory search.
209
  Any evidence discovered during any of these searches 
may be seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine. 
This range of search options would have provided police with a 
powerful investigatory arsenal.  However, the majority added a new 
weapon to that arsenal: the authority to search the vehicle for evidence 
related to the crime of arrest whenever police have “reason[] to believe” 
that such evidence may be in the vehicle.
210
  While the Court emphasized 
that traffic violations like the one leading to Gant’s arrest would rarely 
produce such reasonable belief,
211
 it unfortunately did not define what that 
term required.  As noted in this Article, it may be tempting to equate 
reasonable belief with reasonable suspicion.  However, doing so is 
inconsistent with the fundamental limitations on the authority derived from 
reasonable suspicion:  reasonable suspicion has simply never been a 
sufficient quantum of cause to justify an evidentiary search.
212
  Because, 
                                                                                                                          
208 Id. at 343 n.4 (“Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle 
occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real 
possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.”). 
209 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (“When vehicles are impounded, 
local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the 
automobile’s contents.”). 
210 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
211 Id. at 343. 
212 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968) (“A search for weapons in the absence of 
probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the 
exigencies which justify its initiation.  Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the 
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically 
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according to Gant, a reasonable belief creates just such a justification, it is 
illogical to conclude that the Court intended the term to be a synonym for 
reasonable suspicion.  This conclusion is bolstered by the Court’s decision 
in Richards v. Wisconsin,
213
 which illustrates that where the Court intends 
to extend the concept of reasonable suspicion to other contexts (in 
Richards the justification for dispensing with the knock and announce 
requirement), it uses that term rather than some cryptic synonym.
214
  It is 
even more illogical to conclude that reasonable belief was intended to be a 
synonym for probable cause.  First, the terminology is markedly different 
from probable cause.  More importantly, treating reasonable belief as such 
a synonym would render the term superfluous; the existence of probable 
cause alone provides an independent and well-established justification to 
search for evidence in the automobile at the scene of arrest without a 
warrant.
215
 
Tracing the roots of Gant’s reasonable belief concept back to its 
origins reveals the most logical meaning of the term: a procedural tether 
between the probable cause for the arrest and the search for evidence in the 
automobile.  A review of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton 
v. United States, the opinion on which the Gant majority relies for the 
reasonable belief concept, indicates that it was never conceived as a 
substantive causal justification.
216
  Instead, it was intended to be a modern 
day variant of the “area within the arrestee’s possession” concept that 
defined the legitimate scope of a SITLA prior to Chimel’s narrowing of 
that scope to the arrestee’s “lunging distance.”  However, Chimel did in 
fact narrow the scope of the SITLA from the Harris/Rabinowitz “area in 
possession” to the arrestee’s “lunging distance.”  As a result, it was 
impossible to assert that a search of the automobile of a recent arrestee for 
evidence related to the offense is justified because the automobile was in 
his “possession” at the time of the arrest.  Nonetheless, the logic of that 
aspect of Harris and Rabinowitz could be resurrected on one condition: the 
nature of the offense of arrest leads to a reasonable belief that evidence 
associated with such offense is normally found in the area within the 
arrestee’s possession.  Ultimately, this logic led the Gant majority to allow 
the search for such evidence in an automobile based solely on the nature of 
the offense, with no other articulable basis to justify the search.  This 
indicates two unavoidable conclusions.  First, the “reasonable belief” 
                                                                                                                          
be characterized as something less than a ‘full’ search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.” 
(citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))). 
213 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
214 Id. at 394–96. 
215 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817 (1982) (providing an example of a legitimate 
warrantless search). 
216 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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search authority of Gant is entirely distinct from SITLA authority, 
indicating that the scope limitations of the automobile SITLA are 
inapplicable.  Second, reasonable belief is not synonymous with reasonable 
suspicion because of the lack of an individualized articulable fact 
requirement to establish the belief.  It is the nature of the offense of arrest 
alone, and no specific indicator of the presence of evidence in the 
automobile, that renders the belief reasonable. 
The net result of Gant, therefore, is not as debilitating to police as it 
may first appear.  In fact, police retain all of the pre-existing vehicle search 
justifications (a point emphasized by the Gant majority).  While SITLA 
authority will normally be terminated once the arrestee is restrained, this 
will not always prohibit a suspicion-less search of the automobile.  If the 
offense of arrest is one that normally involves the possession of associated 
evidence, police will be authorized to search the vehicle.  Furthermore, 
unlike the SITLA search, these “reasonable belief” searches will not be 
confined to the interior compartment of the automobile.  As long as it is the 
type of evidence that may be concealed on other parts of the vehicle, those 
parts (most importantly the trunk) should fall within the scope of the 
justification. 
Gant does, however, substantially alter one particularly troubling type 
of post-arrest vehicle search:  those based on arrest for a traffic infraction.  
These SITLA’s have always seemed troubling because of the perception 
that police use the arrest as a pretext in order to trigger SITLA authority.  It 
is clear that the Court has foreclosed the ability to challenge the subjective 
motivation for an arrest, and that nothing in Gant altered that aspect of 
SITLA.  However, because the arrestee will rarely, if ever, have evidence 
related to a traffic arrest in the automobile, Gant effectively nullifies the 
efficacy of the SITLA triggered by a traffic arrest.  The arrest will 
presumptively result in restraint of the arrestee, terminating the SITLA 
authority.  This fact, when coupled with the inability to assert a reasonable 
belief that evidence related to the offense will be found in the vehicle, will 
place any vehicle search based on the arrest outside the bounds of 
reasonableness defined by Gant. 
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